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 PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-1084 
___________ 
 
SPIRIDON SPIREAS, 
 
 Appellant 
 v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 
 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States Tax Court  
 (T.C. No. 13-10729) 
Tax Court Judge: Honorable Albert G. Lauber 
___________ 
 
Argued October 10, 2017 
Before: HARDIMAN, SHWARTZ, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
ORDER AMENDING OPINION 
 
  IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the opinion in the above case, filed March 
26, 2018, be amended as follows: 
 
 Page 15, footnote 9, line 3, which read: 
As the dissent points out, the prudential roots of the civil waiver doctrine 
differentiate it from its criminal analogues with respect to the second and 
third questions—failure to raise an argument in a civil case is generally met 
with relatively softer consequences, and is more readily excused, than in a 
criminal case. But Joseph addressed (and this appeal implicates) only the 
threshold question of whether an argument was made in the first place. 
 
  
 shall read: 
As the dissent points out, the prudential roots of the civil waiver doctrine 
differentiate it from its criminal analogues with respect to the second and 
third questions—failure to raise an argument in a civil case is generally met 
with relatively softer consequences, and is more readily excused, than in a 
criminal case. Indeed, we have recognized our discretion to reach an 
argument that was not made to the district court in a number of 
circumstances, such as where it presents a purely legal question we think it 
is in the public interest to resolve. See, e.g., Covertech Fabricating, Inc. v. 
TVM Bldg. Prods., Inc., 855 F.3d 163, 172 n.4 (3d Cir. 2017). But Joseph 
addressed (and this appeal implicates) only the threshold question of 
whether an argument was made in the first place. 
 
 Page 15, footnote 9, line 16, which read: 
And because Spireas does not ask for any waiver to be excused, there is no 
reason for our analysis to proceed onward to consider whether it might be 
prudent to do so. We decline to sua sponte “waive the waiver” to reach an 
argument that Spireas specifically disclaimed in the Tax Court. Cf. 
Washington, 869 F.3d at 208. 
 
 shall read: 
Under that rule, Spireas failed to raise his prospective transfer argument in 
the Tax Court, and we decline to exercise our discretion to reach it on 
appeal. 
 
 
       BY THE COURT, 
 
s/ Thomas M. Hardiman            
       Circuit Judge 
Dated: June 1, 2018 
